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This paper exploits a unique cross-country, firm-level survey to study the responses
of European firms to the sharp demand and credit contraction triggered by the
global Great Recession of 2009. The analysis reveals that cost reduction—particularly
labour cost reduction through the adjustment of quantities rather than prices—was
the prevailing strategy that firms had adopted by summer 2009. Remarkably, not
even during the worst postwar recession did employers cut base wages to reduce
costs. Different combinations of adjustment strategies are apparent, and the
particular choices of labour costs adjustments depend substantially on countries’
institutional settings.
JEL codes: J30, J32, J33, J51
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survey; Wage cuts; European Union1 Introduction
How do firms adjust to a deep and sudden fall in demand? Are these reactions differ-
ent or reinforced when the drop in sales is paired with a credit drain? A firm can ad-
just through prices, margins, and costs. The menu of cost-cutting alternatives is large:
firms might, at least partially, pass the costs of the fall in demand along to suppliers,
renegotiating the prices of intermediate inputs. In parallel, or alternatively, firms might
adjust labour costs by lowering either employment or wages. The relative importance
of each of these margins of adjustment is likely to depend on the intensity and nature
of the shock as well as on the structural features of the product and labour markets
where the firm operates. This paper sheds some new light on these questions, drawing
on a large survey of European firms during the 2009 global economic crisis.
The survey, carried out by the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), a research network
of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), was administered in two waves. The
first, conducted during the last two quarters of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008, in-
cluded a wide array of questions on firm characteristics, workforce composition, price-
and wage-setting behaviours, and certain features of the economic environment in
which the firm operated at that time. Importantly, the base period of observation pre-
dates the Great Recession, and hence information refers to each firm’s structural char-
acteristics before the negative shocks hit. The second wave, during the third quarter of2015 Fabiani et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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ning to use, to cope with the global crisis.
The main advantage and rationale for launching an ad hoc survey of private sector
firm managers during the Great Recession lay in the wealth and scope of information
that could be collected. Typical firm-level data have little information on a firm’s labour
force, hence are silent on the different channels of labour cost adjustment. Matched
employer-employee data constitute a great stride towards filling this gap, but even in
this case, important information is missing. The information on the firm side is usually
rather limited, constraining the analysis of the adjustment strategies that firms may use.
Moreover, the nature of the shocks hitting the firms is usually not observed, and hence
has to be inferred from the data. Instead, the use of a survey allows respondents to
assess qualitatively the nature and intensity of these shocks.
This paper, after presenting the firms’ perceptions of the shocks they faced, discusses
the various adjustment mechanisms that firms put in place in response to these shocks
during the incipient stages of the global economic crisis in 2008–09. First, we look at
the primary responses to these negative shocks: changes in output, prices, margins, and
costs. The discussion illustrates the importance of cost-cutting strategies relative to the
other adjustment mechanisms and introduces the second part of the analysis, where we
concentrate on the alternative cost-cutting strategies the firms adopted. In particular,
we investigate the relative importance of wage reductions (in either base wages or flex-
ible wage components), reductions in labour inputs (e.g., hours), and the adjustment of
temporary and permanent workers. As a residual option, we also assess the importance
of nonlabour cost-cutting policies.
The closest work to our paper is Bertola et al. (2012), who analyse the different
adjustment strategies firms can employ in response to hypothetical supply-side
shocks using data from the first wave of the same survey we exploit here. In this
paper, rather than looking at a firm’s response to a hypothetical cost shock, we
concentrate on its actual response during the Great Recession’s initial phase in
Europe—from the start of the crisis (third quarter of 2008) through mid-2009. This
period was characterised by a large negative demand shock accompanied by a
credit crunch. Hence, the main difference between the two studies lies in the na-
ture of the shock considered and in the hypothetical shock addressed in the 2007
questionnaire versus the factual shock addressed in the 2009 questionnaire.
Our findings illustrate the vast heterogeneity of firm reactions to these negative
shocks. Yet they also show how the different responses were theoretically consis-
tent—both with the firms’ internal characteristics and with the features of the
labour and product markets in which they operate. Some important messages stand
out: base wages are cut, if at all, as a last resort. During the first year of the worst
economic crisis since the Great Depression, firms were unwilling to cut base wages
in an attempt to protect jobs. The only notable exception were Estonian firms,
which suffered the worst negative shock and operate in the most flexible wage-
setting institutional environment among our sample of countries.
Adjustment of nonlabour costs is the first cost-cutting strategy that European firms
were willing to adopt, and laying off permanent workers was the last. Reduction of flexible
wage components and temporary jobs serve as a buffer when other forms of adjustment
are unavailable or unaffordable.
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used in the analysis. Section 3 discusses the main theoretical channels through which
firms are likely to cope with a fall in demand or a negative shock in credit markets, set-
ting the scene for the empirical analysis of the following sections. Section 4 presents
the nature of the shocks hitting the sample of European firms covered in the survey.
Section 5 focuses on the broad margins of adjustment that firms use—from price-
setting mechanisms to changes in profit margins and costs. Section 6 concentrates in-
stead on the subset of firms that adjusted costs in response to the Great Recession. The
wealth of information from our surveys allows us to examine how different cost-cutting
strategies relate to firm and institutional characteristics. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
The analysis is based on a cross-country, firm-level dataset collected through surveys
conducted by an ESCB research network, the Wage Dynamics Network. The surveys
were deployed in two waves. The first wave was launched by the national central banks
of 17 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain) between the second half of 2007 and the first
quarter of 20081. Its aim was to collect information on firms’ wage- and price-setting
practices (most of which is not available from other sources) as well as on a wide range
of the firms’ characteristics. The survey samples were designed to be representative at
the country level, and the questionnaires were harmonised across countries2.
The second wave of the survey went to the field between July and September of
2009. It was carried out in only 11 countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, and Spain) and
submitted to firms that had participated in the first wave. This questionnaire was
shorter and aimed specifically to investigate the recession’s impact on the firms’ adjust-
ment margins, with particular emphasis on wage and labour strategies.
Both waves were addressed to enterprise managers and were conducted either by
traditional mail, phone, face-to-face interviews, or through the Internet.
The survey’s sample size, sampling probabilities, and nonresponse patterns varied
across countries, as well as sectoral coverage and firm size. The analysis presented here
is based on the subset of the firms that participated in both waves. We consider only
firms with at least five employees in manufacturing, trade, and market services—the
sectors covered in all countries. We exclude data from Cyprus and Luxembourg be-
cause they are not fully comparable in the aspects this paper focuses upon. The analysis
considers a total of 4,658 firm-level observations. Table 1 shows the distribution of the
final sample by country, sector, and size.
To make the results representative of the total population of the sectors considered,
the cross-country statistics presented in the following sections are constructed using
employment-adjusted weights that add up to total employment in the population the
sample represents3.
An advantage of our data is that, in the first wave of the survey, firms were directly
asked about certain features of their institutional setups and economic environments
that are rarely available in administrative and household datasets. As for the firm-level
institutional arrangements governing wage formation, the survey provides evidence on,
Table 1 Sample composition by country, sector, and firm size
# firms Per cent
Austria 262 5.6
Belgium 806 17.3










Market Services 1349 29
Firm size: 5–19 1116 24
Firm size: 20–49 1057 22.7
Firm size: 50–199 1408 30.2
Firm size: 200+ 1077 23.1
Source: WDN surveys
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firm-level adjustment of wages to inflation, whether the firm follows time-dependent or
state-dependent rules to modify wages and prices, and how frequent those adjustments
are. Concerning the economic environment, the aspects of greater interest for our ana-
lysis are those that directly affect wage and labour adjustment strategies, that is, the de-
gree of competitive pressure faced by the firm, its exposure to foreign markets, and
different aspects of its price-setting behaviour. Another important set of relevant data
from the survey concerns the firm’s workforce composition (fraction of permanent and
temporary workers, of high-skilled and low-skilled workers, of white-collar and blue-
collar workers); the degree of labour turnover; and the share of labour costs in total
costs.
Most importantly for our analysis, information on all these features relates to the
timing of the first wave of the survey, usually 2007—a period preceding the demand
and financial shocks in Europe from the global crisis. This timing renders such struc-
tural features predetermined, in a purely econometric sense, relative to the responses to
shocks that this paper focuses upon in the empirical analysis.
By summer 2009, when the respondents were recontacted in the second wave of the
survey to answer a short questionnaire on the impact of the crisis and their reactions
to it (see Additional file 1), the economic environment had changed considerably. Busi-
ness activity was falling in most countries, inflation had declined substantially, un-
employment rates were increasing, and the short-term outlook was highly uncertain.
Firms were asked, among other things, to assess the intensity of the demand decrease
for their products as well as the stringency of the financial constraints they suffered be-
cause of the crisis. The respondents who acknowledged a fall in demand were then
asked to qualify the nature of their reactions to it by assessing the relative relevance of
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the questionnaire, firms that considered cost reductions to be a relevant adjustment
strategy to counter the fall in demand were further asked about the “most important
channel through which they achieved those reductions”.
The response rate for the second wave of the survey was 53%. Because only about
half of the firms that participated in the first wave also agreed to take part in the
second, our sample may be potentially biased. The bias may stem from the nonrandom
selection of firms in the second wave of the survey (e.g., some firms hit by a particularly
strong negative shock ceased to exist). To assess the relevance of this potential selec-
tion bias, we compare the characteristics of the firms that participated in both surveys
(uncensored firms) with those of the firms that responded only to the first wave (cen-
sored firms). The comparison between the mean values in the two groups for these
selected characteristics (later used as explanatory variables in the regressions) shows
that the censored and uncensored samples are quite similar (Table 2). In particular, we
do not find a significant loss of smaller firms, which suggests that attrition (at the time
of the survey) was not particularly concentrated among those firms that presumptively
would have been considered more vulnerable.
3 Theoretical considerations
The optimal response of firms to a negative shock is broadly determined by three fac-
tors: the nature of the shock, the firm’s particular situation when the shock occurs, and
the firm’s product and labour market environments. Of particular relevance for this
paper is the interaction between (a) the structural and institutional features of the









Manufacturing 0.502 0.475 4658 3972
Trade 0.208 0.204 4658 3972
Market Services 0.290 0.321 4658 3972
Firm size: 5–19 0.240 0.264 4658 3972
Firm size: 20–49 0.227 0.214 4658 3972
Firm size: 50–199 0.302 0.292 4658 3972
Firm size: > = 200 0.231 0.231 4658 3972
Share of white-collar workers 0.371 0.332 4303 3698
Share of high-skilled workers 0.402 0.429 4303 3698
Share of permanent workers 0.908 0.896 4608 3897
Labour turnover 0.336 0.338 4373 3666
Labour cost share 0.331 0.327 4265 3601
Strong competitive pressures 0.552 0.564 4106 3637
Flexible pay component 0.084 0.095 3939 3581
Time-dependent wage change 0.585 0.596 4600 3913
Wage change more often than yearly 0.137 0.141 4563 3891
Wage change yearly 0.654 0.678 4563 3891
Wage change less often than yearly 0.183 0.160 4563 3891
Source: WDN surveys
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firms’ main options for reacting to a negative demand or credit shock: reductions in
prices, output, margins, and costs.
The origin of the shock, its expected duration, and its depth are all relevant to the
optimal choice between these options. A negative demand shock is likely to lead to
both price and output cuts. The “price versus quantity” responses depend on the extent
of price and wage stickiness the firm faces and on its degree of market power. If prices
are flexible, the reaction to a negative demand shock largely depends on the cyclical be-
haviour of price and cost margins, a subject which has been of strong controversy in
macroeconomics. Countercyclical markups in oligopolistic industries suggest that firms
are more likely to increase margins when demand is low, hence limiting the output and
price responses to shocks (Rotemberg and Saloner 1986). However, procyclical markups
may also arise in noncompetitive settings (Green and Porter 1984). Procyclical markups
are also a key feature of the earlier Keynesian models, where wage stickiness is the
central assumption (e.g., Keynes 1936; Phelps 1968; Taylor 1980). In this setting, mar-
gins are likely to shrink in response to the negative demand shock because firms are
more likely to cut prices.
If prices are sticky, margin and output cuts are more likely to occur in response to a
negative demand shock. However, this response is not independent of product and
labour market conditions. While the extent of output cuts in the presence of sticky
prices depends mostly on the elasticity of demand, the extent of margin adjustments is
influenced by the firm’s monopsonistic market power and the firms’ ability to cut costs,
which in turn depends on the structural features of the labour markets that are dis-
cussed below.
The recent global economic crisis hit firms not only with a negative demand shock
but also with an unprecedented credit crunch due to lack of confidence in the banks’
balance sheets. Binding credit constraints in principle exacerbate cost-cutting strategies,
but the effects on price and output channels are ambiguous. Profit-maximising firms
are unlikely to cut either prices or production in response to a sudden drop in external
financial resources that they perceive as temporary. Instead, firms facing a credit drain
are more likely to exert pressure on internal and external costs to limit the negative im-
pact of reduced cash flows. The specific cost-cutting channels depend on the intensity
and perceived duration of the shock as well as on product and labour demand
constraints.
Strategies to reduce labour costs include wage reductions (of baseline or flexible wage
components) and employment adjustment (either on the intensive margin through
hours worked or on the extensive margin through the number of temporary or per-
manent workers). This choice is affected by the nature of product market competition
and the institutional constraints on wage and employment adjustment (especially,
among the constraints, the interaction between union behaviour and the strictness of
employment protection legislation).
Wage bargaining in most European countries occurs between workers’ and em-
ployers’ associations, often at higher levels of centralisation than the firm level (such as
the sector and the region level). Differences in the extent of unionisation and in the
level of bargaining across countries are apparent, especially between the euro area and
the non-euro area countries. Similarly, there is heterogeneity within countries in the
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analysis.
In this light, it is natural to think about labour cost reduction mechanisms in the frame-
work of wage-bargaining models. In a “right to manage” approach, firms are always on
their labour demand curve. In this setting, wage and employment responses are expected
to increase with the elasticity of labour demand and (by the “Hicks-Marshall” rules of de-
rived demand) with the price elasticity of demand in the product market. Hence, firms op-
erating in more competitive sectors or markets are expected to show stronger quantity
and price adjustments in labour. The composition of the wage bill is also important: firms
with a larger share of flexible pay components in total pay are more likely to cut bonuses
and less likely to cut base wages when a negative demand shock occurs.
However, wage rigidity might arise when employers and unions bargain over employ-
ment and wages. In this setting, the outcome of the bargaining game is outside the
labour demand curve; in the particular case of isoelastic demand, efficient bargaining
contracts imply rigid real wages (McDonald and Solow 1981). In the presence of impli-
cit contracts, the perceived nature of the shock is also relevant. If the shock is tempor-
ary, firms are less likely to cut wages than if they perceive the shock as permanent
(Guiso et al. 2005). If unionisation or implicit contracts limit the adjustment of wages
to demand fluctuations, we expect to see greater adjustment of employment or hours.
Employment adjustment costs also result in allocations outside the firm’s labour de-
mand curve (Bertola 1999). Other things equal, firing and hiring costs are likely to push
adjustment away from open-ended contracts and towards wages and other forms of
flexible employment. However, they may also limit wage adjustments; Holden (2004)
argues that unionisation and firing costs increase workers’ bargaining power when con-
tracts can only be renegotiated by mutual consent, thus increasing downward nominal
wage rigidity. Consistent with this prediction, Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) find that
industry data from countries with strict EPL and high union density show large down-
ward nominal wage rigidity.
Finally, the interaction of the institutional framework governing labour markets and
credit constraints is also likely to affect the choice among cost-cutting strategies. Par-
ticularly in environments with high employment protection, firms subject to credit con-
straints make higher use of fixed-term contracts, which carry the bulk of employment
adjustment (Caggese and Cuñat 2008). Hence, firms operating in countries with more-
stringent EPL and having trouble financing their operations are less likely to lay off per-
manent workers, and they are more likely to either reduce wages or cut labour costs in
alternative, more flexible ways.
4 Incidence of financial and demand shocks during the crisis
How intense were the negative demand and financial shocks that hit European firms in
mid-2009? Were they significantly heterogeneous across countries? Did their severity
depend on firms’ characteristics?
Table 3 presents the shares of firms—across countries, sectors, and firm size—which
reported (a) a weak demand shock, (b) a strong demand shock but a weak credit shock,
and (c) both a strong demand shock and a strong credit shock. The survey question
allowed answers on a scale of 1 to 4, increasing with the intensity of each shock: (1) “None
at all/marginal,” (2) “Moderate,” (3) “Strong,” and (4) “Exceptionally strong.” We group
Table 3 Incidence of demand and credit shocks (percentages)
Weak demand
shock
Strong demand + weak
credit shock
Strong demand + strong
credit shock
Austria 70.5 24.0 5.4
Belgium 56.4 29.9 13.8
Czech Republic 46.6 34.6 18.8
Estonia 19.4 46.2 34.4
France 64.4 30.1 5.6
Italy 56.1 31.3 12.6
Netherlands 61.7 27.3 10.9
Poland 77.9 14.3 7.9
Spain 59.5 21.0 19.4
Total 61.6 26.6 11.9
Euro area 59.9 28.2 11.9
Non-euro area 67.3 20.9 11.7
Manufacturing 49.6 34.3 16.1
Trade 69.3 20.3 10.5
Market Services 73.1 19.9 7.0
Firm size: 5–19 65.0 19.4 15.7
Firm size: 20–49 54.9 31.4 13.7
Firm size: 50–199 64.1 25.3 10.6
Firm size: > = 200 62.6 27.1 10.3
Source: WDN surveys. Note: Figures are employment-weighted and rescaled excluding “do not know” answers
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shock.”
Some interesting facts emerge from this table:
 In mid-2009, firms in all countries perceived the negative demand shock to be more
important than the credit supply shock. However, the incidence of strong negative de-
mand shock was larger in the euro area countries (about 40% of firms) than in non-
euro area countries (about 32%).
 The euro area and non-euro area countries showed no major differences in the per-
centage of firms suffering both a strong demand shock and strong financial constraints
(about 12%).
 Cross-country heterogeneity is greater in terms of demand shock strength: Estonian
firms reported the most severe demand shock (around 80%), and Polish firms, the
weakest (only slightly more than 20%).
 At the sectoral level, both shocks fell disproportionally strongly on manufacturing
firms.
 As expected, financial constraints were stronger among smaller firms: about 16% of the
firms with 5–19 employees suffered both a negative demand shock and credit
constraints, but this percentage fell to 10% among firms with more than 50 employees.
We also performed a multivariate analysis to identify the main features differentiating
companies by the type and intensity of the shocks they experienced, taking into ac-
count the interaction between country, sector, and corporate characteristics. The
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constructed on the basis of the three shock-type categories described above, assumes
values from 1 to 3. The covariates included in the estimated equation are firm-level fea-
tures such as workforce composition (shares of white-collar, high-skilled, and perman-
ent workers among total employees); fixed effects for the sector of activity; the firm’s
size; and the country. Information on these aspects is based on responses to the 2007
questionnaire.
The estimated coefficients for the second and third categories versus the first one
(i.e., the group that reported no significant shock, which is the baseline) are presented
in Table 4. The results indicate that, controlling for the country and the sector of activ-
ity, the nature and intensity of the shocks are strongly related to workforce compos-
ition. In particular, companies employing higher shares of white-collar, high-skilled, and
permanent workers were less likely to experience a strong contraction of demand and
credit. Another significant aspect is the degree of competitive pressure: firms with a
higher exposure to foreign markets (captured by the share of turnover generated
abroad) were more likely to experience both strong demand and strong credit shocks.
Clearly, a firm’s perception of the demand or credit shock intensity depends on the
past volatility of the underlying variable, and this may differ systematically across the
sampled countries. Thus, the incidence of strong demand or credit shocks may not beTable 4 Multinomial logit regression on the intensity of shocks (base outcome shock = 1: weak
demand shock)
shock = 2: strong demand + weak credit shock = 3: strong demand + strong credit
coeff tstat coeff tstat
Manufacturing 0.5 4.5 Manufacturing 0.7 4.7
Trade −0.1 −0.7 Trade −0.2 −1.1
Market Services − − Market Services − −
Size 5 − 19 −0.1 −0.7 Size 5 − 19 0.4 2.4
Size 20 − 49 −0.1 −0.4 Size 20 − 49 0.0 0.1
Size 50 − 199 −0.2 −2.1 Size 50 − 199 −0.3 −2.1
Size > =200 − − Size > =200 − −
Austria −0.4 −1.7 Austria −1.4 −3.6
Belgium 0.1 0.8 Belgium −0.5 −1.5
Czech_Rep 0.1 0.4 Czech_Rep 0.1 0.3
Estonia 1.4 4.4 Estonia 2.0 6.0
France 0.1 0.6 France −0.7 −3.1
Italy 0.2 1.1 Italy −0.1 −0.4
Netherlands −0.2 −1.0 Netherlands −0.9 −3.5
Poland − − Poland − −
Spain −0.3 −1.8 Spain 0.1 0.3
Share of white-collar workers −0.3 −1.9 Share of white collar workers −0.5 −2.1
Share of high-skill workers −0.1 −0.7 Share of high-skill workers −0.4 −2.2
Share of permanent workers −0.7 −3.4 Share of permanent workers −1.1 −4.6
Labour cost share −0.7 −2.9 Labour cost share −0.7 −2.5
Price taker 0.2 1.9 Price taker 0.1 1.2
Export share 0.8 5.7 Export share 0.4 2.2
Source: WDN surveys. Note: T-statistics are obtained from robust standard errors
Fabiani et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:24 Page 10 of 28directly comparable across countries. To assess possible dissonance in the data from
differences in past economic experiences, we compare the observed pattern of aggre-
gate gross domestic product (GDP) with the average magnitude of the negative credit
and demand shocks perceived by firms in each economy. Figures 1 and 2 show scatter-
plot diagrams depicting the cumulative change in GDP from Q2 2008 to Q2 2009 (in
percentage terms) on the y-axes and the fraction of firms reporting either a strong de-
mand shock (Fig. 1) or a strong credit shock (Fig. 2) on the x-axes.
The correlation coefficients are rather high in absolute terms: −0.92 and −0.81 for de-
mand and credit shocks, respectively. When Estonia, which is the country experiencing
the largest GDP contraction is excluded, the coefficients drop to −0.70 and −0.434. The
actual change in GDP is hence sufficiently strongly correlated with the magnitude of
the negative shocks perceived by firms. This correlation, however, does not rule out the
possibility of a divergent interpretation of the same questions across countries or sec-
tors. It is for this reason that the econometric exercises we carry out in the next section
include country and sector fixed effects, which should control for systematic differences
in historical volatility of demand and credit constraints as well as for possible differ-
ences in the interpretation of some questions.5 Primary reactions to shocks
As discussed in Section 3, firms may react to a negative demand shock by adjusting
prices, output, margins, and costs. This section describes how firms used each of these
channels of adjustment during the 2008-09 crisis and how these patterns differed across
countries and various types of firms.
This part of the questionnaire asked firms how relevant each adjustment strategy
was, on a scale from 1 to 4: (1) “Not relevant,” (2) “Of little relevance,” (3) “Relevant,”
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Fig. 2 GDP change vs. incidence of strong negative credit shock
Fabiani et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:24 Page 11 of 28Cost reduction was the most common adjustment strategy (Table 5), followed by cuts
in output and margins. Interestingly, 66% of the firms that were hit by a weak demand
shock responded by reducing costs. Taken at face value, this high percentage suggests
that a great majority of firms are not cost-minimising ones, i.e., they have scope for fur-
ther cost reductions in response to a negative demand shock5.
Not surprisingly, the fraction of firms choosing each of the proposed strategies in-
creases with the intensity of the shock. However, this pattern is not homogeneous
across strategies. In particular, reducing output is the option with the highest elasticity
to the strength of the demand shock: the shares of firms choosing that option when
faced with a weak or a strong demand shock were 21.3 and 62%, respectively. The share
rises to 67% when strong credit constraints accompany the demand shock.
In line with the theoretical predictions, the strategies most commonly followed by firms
affected by credit constraints during the crisis are reductions in output, margins, and
costs. Cutting margins is the main adjustment channel for 46.2% of the firms facing a
strong demand and a weak credit shock; the percentage increases by 16 percentage points
among the firms that also suffer strong credit constraints. Similarly, a strong credit shock
increases the percentage of firms cutting costs by 16 percentage points relative to those
hit only by a fall in demand. Tables 4 and 5 shows that these patterns are broadly consist-
ent across sectors. Overall, margin and cost cuts are more relevant in the trade sector,
possibly suggesting higher rents, whereas output reductions are more prevalent in manu-
facturing than in the other sectors, against both weak and strong demand shocks.
Firms facing more severe negative shocks used all possible channels of adjustment more
intensively. Indeed, the pair-wise correlations (Table 6) show that the incidence of the
various strategies (particularly of price and margin reductions) is positively correlated.
Table 7 presents the proportion of firms that considered various combinations of
adjustment channels to be “relevant” or “very relevant.” We sort these combina-
tions on the basis of their incidence in the overall sample of firms. In addition, the
last row presents the proportion of firms that considered none of the four channels
Table 5 Firms’ reactions to shocks, by sector (percentage of firms attributing relevance or great
relevance to a given reaction)
Weak demand Strong demand + weak credit shock Strong demand + strong credit shock
All sectors
Reduce prices 31.5 41.7 50.3
Reduce margins 37.0 46.2 62.2
Reduce output 21.3 61.9 66.8
Reduce costs 66.5 77.8 93.8
Manufacturing
Reduce prices 34.6 37.4 48.1
Reduce margins 38.7 44.5 63.7
Reduce output 36.1 74.6 76.8
Reduce costs 68.0 77.1 95.3
Trade
Reduce prices 37.1 48.1 60.4
Reduce margins 46.5 55.4 75.2
Reduce output 15.6 34.6 43.7
Reduce costs 78.4 86.6 96.1
Market Services
Reduce prices 25.6 48.1 50.9
Reduce margins 30.9 45.3 54.1
Reduce output 10.8 47.4 51.4
Reduce costs 58.7 74.1 86.8
Source: WDN surveys. Note: Figures are employment-weighted and rescaled excluding “do not know” answers
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include cost reduction.
Among firms experiencing a strong demand shock, as expected from theoretical predic-
tions, the most relevant adjustment mechanism was cost reduction in combination with
output reduction,. Among those experiencing only a weak demand shock, the most rele-
vant option was cost cutting in isolation. However, companies suffering strong shocks on
both the demand and financial sides responded that all possible adjustment channels were
relevant: reduction in output, margins, prices, and costs.
6 Alternative cost-cutting strategies
6.1 Descriptive evidence
The remainder of the paper focuses on cost-cutting strategies, discussing in greater depth
the various alternatives that firms implemented during the crisis. The 2009 surveyTable 6 Adjustment strategies: pair-wise correlations
Adjustment strategy Price Margin Output Cost
Price 1
Margin 0.74 1
Output 0.29 0.35 1
Cost 0.31 0.34 0.42 1
Source: WDN surveys. Note: Figures are employment-weighted
















● ● 15.9 9.4 26.9 22.6
● 15.6 20.3 8.8 8.2
● ● ● ● 13.9 9.7 18.1 28.3
● ● ● 10.8 11.1 10.4 8.9
● ● ● 5.8 2.9 7.9 18.5
x x x x 21.1 29.9 8.9 1.9
Source: WDN surveys. Note: Each of the top five rows shows the proportion of firms responding that a given
“combination” of adjustment channels is either “relevant” or “very relevant” to its crisis response. The bottom row
designates the proportion of firms responding that none of the four channels is relevant. Figures are
employment-weighted and rescaled excluding “do not know” answers
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nents; working hours, layoffs of permanent or temporary employees; and nonlabour costs.
Managers were asked to single out the option they consider to be “the most important.”
Overall, labour costs were adjusted more widely than nonlabour costs in response to
the crisis (Table 8): on average, for 64% of the surveyed firms, the main strategy was
some type of labour cost reduction (ranging from 77% in Estonia and Spain to 51% in
Poland). The percentage jumps to 77% among firms that faced a strong demand shock
in conjunction with a weak credit shock, and it is slightly higher (79%) among those
confronted with both strong demand and credit shocks.
Considering each option in isolation, however, firms cut nonlabour costs more often
than any single form of labour costs. Our survey is silent on the precise nature of the
nonlabour cost reductions, but the potential set of alternatives is ample, depending also
on the firm’s sector and degree of vertical integration. For example, price renegotiation
with providers is one common strategy during crises; another is downsizing of ancillary
activities (which might be considered nonessential), typically through externalisation.
Interestingly, according to our survey, nonlabour cost reductions were much more
common among firms that faced weak demand and credit reductions (almost 43%) than
among those that suffered strong shocks on both ends (about 21%). This finding suggests
a notable pattern in firms’ responses to a fall in demand: nonlabour costs are the first to
be cut. Firms reduce labour costs only when the shock is either relatively intense or ex-
pected to be long-lasting. Unfortunately, our questionnaire does not allow us to disentan-
gle these two hypotheses.
Among the channels of labour cost reduction, almost none of the firms chose base
wages as the “most important” option (only 1.2% overall, ranging from 0% in the Czech
Republic to 14% in Estonia). This result confirms that, even during the most severe global
financial crisis of post-World War II history, a high degree of downward nominal wage ri-
gidity persisted—deviating little from firms’ usual practice during nonrecessionary pe-
riods, based on past survey evidence from developed nations such as Switzerland and the
United States7.
To some extent, the lack of flexibility in base wages might be offset by adjusting non-
base wage components, although the same forces that impose rigidity in the former
might also limit changes in bonuses and fringe benefits. The empirical analysis will fur-
ther investigate this issue, but the summary statistics shown in Table 8 indicate that
Table 8 Firms’ cost-cutting strategies in response to economic shocks (percentage of firms














Austria 0.3 12.2 12.2 11.1 36.2 28.0
Belgium 0.9 3.1 16.8 29.6 24.9 24.6
Czech Republic 0.0 10.4 27.9 16.4 5.3 40.1
Estonia 14.3 25.1 24.2 3.7 9.3 23.5
France 0.1 9.9 17.1 33.9 12.4 26.2
Italy 1.3 8.9 16.6 21.1 18.4 33.7
Netherlands 1.4 5.0 8.1 40.5 6.2 38.8
Poland 1.9 15.9 16.7 9.1 7.6 48.7
Spain 1.0 5.5 23.2 41.6 5.9 22.8
Total 1.2 9.8 16.9 24.3 13.6 33.9
By type of shock
Demand (weak) 0.8 9.5 13.2 21.6 11.6 42.5
Demand (strong) + credit (weak) 1.6 11.9 17.5 29.8 16.1 22.6
Demand + credit (both strong) 2.4 7.0 31.2 24.0 14.6 20.8
Source: WDN surveys. Note: The table presents percentages of firms; they are employment-weighted and rescaled
excluding “do not know” answers
Fabiani et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:24 Page 14 of 28flexible wage components indeed represent an important margin of adjustment for our
sample of European firms: almost 10% chose it as the “most important” cost-cutting
option during the recent economic crisis. The percentage was higher in non-euro area
countries, especially Estonia (25%) and Poland (16%).
Among the three top labour cost reduction strategies overall—laying off permanent em-
ployees, laying off temporary employees, or reducing hours worked—the latter was the
least common option. However, countries show wide heterogeneity in this regard:
Austrian firms were the most widely resolved to reduce working hours to accommodate
the fall in demand during the crisis (36% of which said this margin was the “most import-
ant” cost-cutting strategy). At the other extreme, only 5–6% of the Spanish and Czech
firms singled out that option. The high incidence in Austria is likely related to Kurzarbeit
(or “short work”), a temporary institutional arrangement which allows employers to re-
duce working hours and pays employees government-subsidised special allowances in-
stead of regular wages to cover most of the earnings shortfall. Employees must agree to
the hour reductions, which can vary widely, ranging between 10 and 90% of regular work
time. Although the Kurzarbeit period in Austria typically could not exceed six months,
the Austrian government, in light of the ongoing recession, changed the rules in early
2009 to allow up to 18 months of Kurzarbeit in extreme cases.
Overall, the most widely adopted means of cutting labour costs has been to lay
off temporary employees. Spain (the country in the sample with the highest
incidence of temporary-employee contracts) and the Netherlands stand out in this
respect: almost 42% of the firms in Spain and 40% in the Netherlands tagged it as
the “most important” option. At the other extreme, 24.2% of Estonian companies
said reducing permanent jobs was “most important” as opposed to 3.7% which
would opt to cut temporary jobs.
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important” strategy increases monotonically with the intensity of the shocks. Among the
firms that had faced a weak negative demand shock by summer 2009, only 13% chose per-
manent employment as the “most important” cost to cut; among the firms that faced a
strong demand shock but a weak credit-constraint shock, that percentage increases to
18%. The percentage almost doubles (to 31%) among firms that faced both a strong credit
and strong demand shocks. These results suggest that only when shocks become large are
employers willing to start cutting open-ended contract jobs.
Section 3 discussed the prominent role of the labour market institutional setting
in shaping the optimal firm response to a negative demand shock. Indeed, although
the patterns outlined above are broadly consistent across sectors, firms show sig-
nificant heterogeneity by country in their behaviour. In particular, two institutional
features, union bargaining power and the stringency of employment protection le-
gislation (EPL), are likely to have major impacts on the cost-cutting strategies
analysed here.
According to indicators based on our surveys and to the index of EPL severity in
2008 constructed by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), non-euro area countries tend to have far less collective bargaining coverage
than euro area countries, whereas EPL differences between the two groups are not as
marked (Table 9).
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, in countries where firing costs are
higher, larger percentages of firms lay off temporary employees instead of em-
ployees with open-ended contracts (Fig. 3). The slope of the regression line is 0.24
and significant at the 5% level (right chart). However, there is no evidence of the
inverse relationship regarding permanent workers: the correlation coefficient be-
tween the percentage of firms that implemented permanent job cuts and EPL is
not statistically different from zero (left chart).
As for the relationship between collective bargaining coverage and “quantity versus
price” labour market adjustments, higher union coverage appears to be inversely related
to firms’ ability to adjust wages (Fig. 4)—either base wages (top left) or flexible wage com-
ponents (top right). Only in the latter case, however, is the regression slope statistically
different from zero (coefficient 0.155, standard error 0.054).
The graphs in the bottom row of Fig. 4 suggest that this inability of firms to use
wages as an adjustment mechanism is compensated by somewhat more frequent
employment reductions. In countries with high union coverage, companies cut
temporary employment (bottom left) and hours (bottom right) more often. How-
ever, only in the former case is the relationship with union coverage statistically
significant (coefficient 0.232, standard error 0.109).6.2 Wage cuts and freezes
The survey yielded this striking result: virtually no firm considered base wage cuts to
be its primary strategy for reducing costs until mid-20098. However, this evidence is
not sufficient to infer that base wage cuts did not occur during the crisis, since the sur-
vey asked for each firm’s single “most important” cost-cutting strategy. However, the
depth of the recession in 2009—which, in several countries, was also coupled with



















Austria 97.6 98.6 98.1 31.1 2.2
Belgium 89.0 99.3 97.9 33.2 2.5
Czech Republic 54.3 57.8 18.5 55.5 2.0
Estonia 11.7 14.1 5.6 11.2 2.3
France 67.4 99.9 97.8 57.6 2.9
Italy 97.3 99.7 99.6 42.5 2.4
Netherlands 65.1 74.3 47.4 26.8 2.1
Poland 18.1 21.3 4.0 19.5 2.2
Spain 96.9 100.0 85.8 14.2 3.0
Total 65.1 74.3 47.4 26.8 2.1
Euro area 86.4 96.4 90.1 37.3 2.6
Non-euro area 25.8 29.1 7.2 27.1 2.1
Sources: WDN surveys and OECD 2008. Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
EPL = employment protection legislation. The table shows the share of employees in each country covered by
collective bargaining (column 1) and the percentages of firms that apply collective bargaining contracts (columns
2–4); the figures are employment-weighted. a. The OECD scores countries annually on a scale of least (0) to most
(6) regulatory strictness concerning the temporary contracts and worker protections from dismissal
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sistance to decreasing individual wages. For this purpose, a separate question in the
2009 survey asked firms about the occurrence and coverage among employees of base
wage cuts and freezes since the crisis began. It is interesting to compare the responses
with those provided to the analogous question in the 2007 survey, which concerned the
frequency of base wage cuts and freezes during the previous five years, hence a period
of sustained growth (Table 10).
Interestingly, the incidence of wage reductions evidently did not increase much dur-
ing the global economic downturn. On average, approximately 1.8% of employees in
the sampled countries experienced wage cuts during the 2009 crisis, whereas this share
averaged about 1% in the 2007 survey. In sharp contrast, the share of employees experi-
encing wage freezes rose dramatically, from 5.2% in 2007 to 31.9% in 2009; the jump
was particularly significant in France (77.2 percentage points), the Czech Republic
(37.1), and Italy (29.6).
In other words, in 2009 the degree of downward wage rigidity was still very high in
Europe: firms resorted to freezing wages instead of cutting them, even in an environ-
ment of sharp economic downturn accompanied by near-zero or negative inflation.
There is one notable exception: Estonia. Approximately 44% of Estonian firms had
cut wages by summer 2009, and 39% still planned to do so in relation to the crisis.
Why is Estonia so different from the other countries examined in this work? A plausible an-
swer lies in a combination of four factors: first, the economy has very flexible wage-setting
institutions, with the lowest coverage of collective wage agreements among the sampled
countries. Second, it reformed its labour regulations in 2009, imposing more flexible EPL
and considerably lowering the layoff costs for employers9. As argued earlier, both factors
tend to favour downward wage flexibility (see also Babecký et al. 2010). Third, Estonia in
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Fig. 3 Correlation of EPL strictness and firms’ chosen labour cost-cutting strategy
Fabiani et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:24 Page 17 of 28differentiates it from the other two non-euro area countries in the sample that also have
relatively flexible wage-setting systems but featured floating exchange rate regimes at the
time: the Czech Republic and Poland. These two countries’ national currencies depreciated
during the crisis, which gave firms more leeway to optimise costs and reduced the need to
cut wages. Fourth and perhaps most important, is the intensity of the negative demand
shock that hit the Estonian economy: between Q2 2008 and Q2 2009, GDP fell by 16% (in
seasonally adjusted terms). Seemingly, a decline of such magnitude empowers firms to use
all possible channels for cutting costs, including base wage reductions. The extent of down-
ward flexibility in nominal base wages during the most acute phase of the crisis in Estonia
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Fig. 4 Correlation of union coverage and firms’ chosen labour cost-cutting strategy
Table 10 Incidence of wage cuts and freezes by country and sector, 2007 and 2009 (percentages)
Firms that cut or froze wages Employees who received wage cuts or freezes
2007 2009 (past) 2009 (expected) 2007 2009 (past)
Wage cuts: countries
Austria 1.5 1.7 1.5 0.1 1.2
Belgium 2.9 1.0 1.8 0.2 0.3
Czech Republic 9.3 8.9 3.2 1.1 3.7
Estonia 3.7 44.1 38.6 0.1 30.4
France 2.5 1.9 4.7 0.9 1.2
Italy 0.7 2.0 4.3 0.1 1.1
Netherlands 1.6 2.6 3.8 0.8 1.2
Poland 5.7 4.2 1.6 3.8 2.6
Spain 0.1 2.6 0.5 0.0 1.4
Total 2.6 3.2 3.1 1.0 1.8
Euro area 1.3 2.1 3.3 0.2 1.1
Non-euro area 6.4 6.5 2.7 3.1 3.7
Wage cuts: sectors
Manufacturing 3.1 3.9 2.9 1.7 2.4
Trade 1.3 2.8 2.3 0.6 1.8
Market Services 2.8 2.4 4.2 0.5 1.1
Wage freezes: countries
Austria 9.3 1.8 8.4 5.7 1.1
Belgium 15.9 23.7 4.4 2.4 14.6
Czech Republic 31.4 54.6 11.7 12.0 49.1
Estonia 21.3 61.5 64.6 9.6 56.9
France 7.7 86.0 83.8 5.3 82.5
Italy 3.8 31.7 62.8 1.3 30.9
Netherlands 25.8 15.2 8.7 15.9 12.6
Poland 9.7 18.0 8.1 7.8 16.6
Spain 1.5 26.7 3.7 0.8 22.2
Total 9.5 34.5 34.5 5.2 31.9
Euro area 7.6 37.1 43.1 3.9 34.4
Non-euro area 14.8 27.4 10.3 8.8 25.0
Wage freezes: sectors
Manufacturing 8.2 35.5 39.0 4.3 33.1
Trade 7.0 26.4 26.2 3.0 23.3
Market Services 12.2 42.0 39.4 7.0 39.4
Source: WDN surveys. Note: The table presents percentages of firms and of employees; figures are employment-weighted
and rescaled excluding “do not know” answers
Fabiani et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:24 Page 18 of 286.3 Estimating the probability of alternative cost-cutting strategies
We conclude our analysis with an empirical exercise to explore in greater depth the
firm-level and institutional features associated with the firms’ choice of “most import-
ant” cost-cutting channel in reaction to demand and credit shocks. More specifically,
we estimate a probit model for each of the cost reduction strategies described in sub-
section 6.1.
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the dependent variable is a 0-1 dummy—given a set of covariates that control for the
firm’s characteristics, workforce composition, institutional arrangements governing its
wage setting, and other aspects of the economic environment.
The purpose of the exercise is to describe the responses of the firms’ managers in dif-
ferent subsets of the population, not to estimate underlying parameters. Hence, we fol-
low Hall and Krueger (2012) in the presentation of the results by using the predicted
probabilities from the probit estimations.
As already stated in Section 2, the firms’ characteristics used as covariates are derived
from the first wave of the survey and hence do not refer to their conditions during the
2009 recession but to the their conditions in 2007. The variables used as covariates in
the regression are the following:
 A set of indicators for the sector of economic activity (three categories:
manufacturing, services, and trade)
 A set of indicators for the firm’s size by number of employees (four categories:
5–19, 20–49, 50–199, and > =200)
 A set of indicators for the country where the firm operates (nine countries)
 A set of indicators for the nature and intensity of the shock faced by the firm (three
categories: weak demand shock, strong demand and weak credit shock, and strong
demand and credit shocks)
 The shares of white-collar, high-skilled, and permanent employees on total employ-
ment (continuous variables ranging from 0 to 1)
 The share of flexible pay component (the fraction of bonuses on total pay, a
continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1)
 The fraction of the firm’s employees covered by a collective wage agreement (a
continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1)
 An indicator for the presence of collective wage bargaining at the firm level
 An indicator for time-dependent wage setting at the firm level
 An indicator for firms that adjust wages more frequently than yearly
 The share of labour costs in total costs (a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1)
 An indicator for the intensity of competitive pressures faced by the firm
The variables concerning workforce composition, the share of labour costs on total costs,
and collective bargaining coverage derive from the firms’ quantitative answers to questions
asking them explicitly to provide such figures. The other indicators are instead computed
on the basis of qualitative information. The indicator for the presence of firm-level collect-
ive wage agreements is, rather straightforwardly, a dummy variable equal to 1 if collective
bargaining occurs within the firm. We then define as time-dependent wage setters those
companies that, when asked whether they typically implement wage changes at predeter-
mined times of the year, answered positively (and indicated when, though this last piece of
information is not used here). The indicator for frequent wage adjustment is computed on
the basis of the answers related to the frequency of wage changes (independent of reasons)
and is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reported changing its wages more often than
yearly. Finally, firms facing strong competitive pressures are those that reported being
“likely” or “very likely” to decrease their own prices if their main competitors did the same.
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overall and by cost-cutting strategy (we exclude the “cutting base wages” strategy be-
cause, being the primary option for so few firms, it is of little relevance to this empirical
exercise).
To capture possible nonlinearities, we map the continuous variables which are shares
from 0 to 1 into three discrete classes based on their distribution: “low” if the share is
between the 1st and 33rd percentiles; “medium” if it is between the 33rd and 66th per-
centiles; and “high” if it is above the 66th percentile. The distribution of the share of
permanent employees is highly skewed: above the 40th percentile, all firms reported
that their entire workforces had open-ended contracts. Hence, in this case we just con-
struct an indicator taking the value of 1 if more than 95% of the firm’s employees are
permanent.
We present results in terms of the estimated probability of a “yes” answer from differ-
ent types of firms, along with standard errors of the probability and of its difference
with respect to the baseline. We concentrate on the estimated probabilities that are of
direct relevance in light of the theoretical aspects discussed in Section 3. We proceed
sequentially, with each table representing a cost-cutting strategy.
Our baseline case is a Czech firm operating in the business service sector; of small
size (5–19 employees); facing weak demand and credit shocks; setting wages without a
firm-level, collectively bargained contract and without a particular time pattern at less
than yearly frequency; a firm whose workforce has low shares of temporary, white-
collar, and high-skilled workers; facing weak competitive pressures; having a low share
of wages in total costs; and having a low incidence of bonuses. Before discussing the
estimated probabilities, it should be emphasised that we found few nonlinearities in the
estimated effects; hence, the tables below focus only on some of the extreme cases
(those classified in the “high” class of the distribution).
The estimated probability of reducing the flexible wage component in response to
the global crisis in reported in Table 12. Not surprisingly, firms with a higher fraction
of bonuses on total pay in 2007 were more likely to use this margin of adjustment dur-
ing the 2009 crisis: the estimated probability of cutting flexible pay as the main adjust-
ment strategy is 21.3% for a high-bonus firm, compared with 13.7% in the baseline.
Another aspect of the pay structure is also significant: firms that typically adjust wages
more frequently were less likely to use flexible wage components to adjust their labour
costs. In this case, the estimated probability of cutting flexible pay as the main adjust-
ment strategy is 8.6%, significantly below the baseline. However, another indicator of a
rigid wage structure—a time-dependent wage-setting scheme—does not seem to signifi-
cantly alter the probability of using this adjustment strategy.
Across industries, firms operating in manufacturing and in retail and wholesale trade
were less likely to cut flexible wage components than firms in the business services that
are included in the baseline. The estimated probabilities in manufacturing and trade
are 8 and 8.3%, respectively; in both cases, differences from the baseline are statistically
significant. Note that this result holds over and above differences in the incidence of
bonuses across sectors because we are holding the share of bonuses constant in this ex-
ercise (i.e., the estimated probabilities for the different sectors are relative to a baseline
firm with a low share of bonuses). This result has two possible interpretations: either
service sector firms were more likely to use the flexibility in bonuses intensively as a












Manufacturing 0.41 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.38 0.46
Services 0.40 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.38 0.33
Trade 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.25 0.21
Size: 5–19 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.18 0.13
Size: 20–49 0.24 0.23 0.16 0.27 0.26 0.23
Size: 50–199 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20
Size: > = 200 0.40 0.42 0.56 0.46 0.37 0.44
Austria 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.04
Belgium 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03
Czech Republic 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05
Estonia 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
France 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.13 0.17
Italy 0.34 0.36 0.32 0.50 0.37 0.37
Netherlands 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.09
Poland 0.26 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.23 0.16
Spain 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.09
Weak demand shock 0.55 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.72 0.57
Strong demand + weak credit shock 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.20 0.30
Strong demand + strong credit shock 0.09 0.25 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.13
Share of white-collar workers 0.47 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.45 0.41
Share of high-skilled workers 0.55 0.40 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.42
Share of permanent workers 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.93 0.89 0.90
Flexible pay component 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.09
Coverage of collective agreement 0.62 0.73 0.80 0.85 0.67 0.73
Firm-level collective agreement 0.36 0.38 0.45 0.47 0.32 0.39
Time-dependent wage change 0.46 0.47 0.57 0.50 0.47 0.50
Frequent wage adjustment 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.10
Labour cost share 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.33
Strong competitive pressures 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.49 0.57 0.57
Source: WDN surveys. Note: The table presents employment-weighted averages
Fabiani et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:24 Page 21 of 28consequence of the crisis, or they have other forms of flexible pay that give additional
leeway at the time of cutting wages, such as stock options and flexible fringe benefits.
The estimated effects of workers’ characteristics are also in line with expecta-
tions: firms whose employees include a high percentage of white-collar workers
were more likely to cut flexible wages (the difference from the baseline is 5.6
percentage points). Receiving a strong demand shock increases somewhat the
probability, but the difference from the baseline is relatively small (3 percentage
points); the fact that the shock is strong also on the credit side does not exert a
significant impact (-0.4 percentage points). Neither the type of wage contract nor
the extent of product market competition affects the use of reductions of flexible
pay.
We move next to the analysis of another cost-cutting option: employment adjustment
(Table 13). The first two columns refer to layoffs of permanent employees, and columns
Table 12 Probability of adjusting flexible wages
Probability
(% and standard errors)
Difference from baseline







Large firm 12.9 −0.9
(5.1) (3.4)
Strong demand + weak credit shock 16.7 3.0
(6.4) (2.2)
Strong demand + strong credit shock 13.4 −0.4
(5.4) (2.2)
Time-dependent wages 14.3 0.5
(5.8) (2.1)
Frequent wage adjustment 8.6 −5.1
(4.4) (2.6)
Strong competitive pressures 14.4 0.7
(5.7) (1.9)
Firm-level collective agreement 12.8 −0.9
(5.5) (2.2)
White-collar workers: high (%) 19.3 5.6
(7.4) (3.3)
High-skilled workers: high (%) 17.2 3.4
(6.7) (3.0)
Temporary workers: high (%) 11.2 −2.6
(4.9) (2.1)
Labour cost share: high (%) 14.0 0.2
(5.6) (2.2)
Flexible pay component: high (%) 21.3 7.5
(7.2) (3.2)
Source: WDN surveys. Note: The table shows predicted probability from probit regression. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses. The baseline case is a Czech firm operating in the business service sector; of small size (5–19 employees);
facing weak demand and credit shocks; setting wages without a firm-level, collectively bargained contract and without a
particular time pattern at less than yearly frequency; a firm having a workforce with low shares of temporary, white-
collar, and high-skilled workers; facing weak competitive pressures; and having a low share of wages in total costs and a
low incidence of bonuses
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vided above, relative to the other strategies the size of the shock is of fundamental im-
portance to the firms’ decision to cut the number of permanent workers: suffering a
strong demand or credit shock almost doubles the probability that firms dismiss em-
ployees with open-ended contracts—differences from the baseline are highly significant
in both cases. In contrast with the results on the adjustment through wages, neither
workforce composition nor sector of operation has a significant effect.
In Section 3, we argued that stronger product market competition is likely to increase
the elasticity of labour demand, hence making employment more responsive to shocks.
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more likely to cut permanent employees, although differences from the baseline are
small (2.7 percentage points) and only marginally significant (standard error 1.5). Also
in line with theoretical predictions, firms with a relatively high share of labour costs
were more likely to cut employment during the crisis: the estimated probability is
16.1%, compared with 9.9% in the baseline.
Layoffs of temporary employees were, not surprisingly, more likely to occur in those
firms employing a high share of temporary workers in 2007, as suggested by the posi-
tive difference from the baseline (3.2 percentage points), presented in column 4. Per-
haps more interestingly, it is within larger firms that much of the adjustment occurred
through fixed-term contracts: the likelihood of cutting temporary employment is more
than double that of the baseline (16.1% versus 7.6%) in firms with 200 employees or
more. In this case, neither product market competition nor the share of labour costs in
total cost seems to affect the likelihood of cutting temporary employment. Of similar
interest is the negative impact of bonuses: in firms with a high share of bonuses, the
probability of cutting temporary employment is almost 2 percentage points lower than
the baseline, suggesting some degree of complementarity between flexible forms of pay-
ment and flexible forms of employment.
This complementarity is weakly confirmed by the results on the reduction of hours
(first two columns of Table 14): the baseline probability of cutting hours worked is
4.6%, compared with 3.1% among firms with a high share of bonuses in total pay. The
difference, though, is not statistically significant.
As regards the adjustment by reducing nonlabour costs, the probit estimation con-
firms the raw differences in the means obtained in the descriptive analysis, suggesting
that nonwage costs are likely to be the immediate reaction to a negative shock if the
shock is small (last two columns of Table 14). The probability weakens as the size of
the shock increases: the baseline estimate (66.8%) drops by more than 20 percentage
points if the firm is hit by a strong demand shock and by almost 10 percentage points
if it is hit by both strong demand and credit shocks. Interestingly, nonlabour costs were
also more commonly reduced during the recession by firms with more flexible wages,
as captured by the frequent-wage-adjustment indicator (more often than once a year):
the estimated difference is large (6.6 percentage points) and statistically significant. Lar-
ger firms were also less likely to select nonlabour costs as their main cost-cutting strat-
egy, as suggested by the large difference (−17.7 percentage points) from the baseline
probability.
A last aspect is the role of unions and wage bargaining. Our indicator for the pres-
ence of a firm-level contract does not seem to alter significantly any of the adjustment
mechanisms reviewed, which is in sharp contrast with the scatterplot diagrams measur-
ing correlation between summary bargaining-power indicators and the countries’
“most-chosen” cost-cutting options (Figs. 3 and 4, described early in this section). This
finding depends on the fact that, by and large, differences in bargaining regimes within
the sample countries are very limited, with some countries displaying ratios of collect-
ive bargaining coverage which are close to one. In this context, the role of wage bar-
gaining in firms’ choices is evident only when the between-country variation is
exploited, a feature that our regressions do not allow because of the inclusion of coun-
try fixed effects.
Table 13 Probability of cutting permanent and fixed-term employment













Manufacturing 12.4 2.5 8.5 0.9
(4.4) (1.9) (3.4) (1.2)
Trade 13.3 3.4 7.1 −0.4
(4.7) (2.4) (3.1) (1.4)
Large firm 11.0 1.1 16.1 8.6
(3.9) (2.3) (5.3) (3.0)
Strong demand +
weak credit shock
19.6 9.8 9.6 2.0
(5.9) (2.7) (3.9) (1.2)
Strong demand +
strong credit shock
18.2 8.4 6.2 −1.4
(5.7) (2.6) (2.8) (1.1)
Time-dependent
wages
7.9 −2.0 9.7 2.1
(3.2) (1.3) (3.8) (1.3)
Frequent wage
adjustment
7.9 −2.0 8.0 0.4
(3.5) (1.7) (3.5) (1.4)
Strong competitive
pressures
12.6 2.7 6.3 −1.3




10.3 0.5 7.7 0.1
(4.0) (1.6) (3.2) (1.1)
White-collar
workers: high (%)
11.3 1.5 4.6 −2.9
(4.3) (1.9) (2.3) (1.4)
High-skilled
workers: high (%)
10.7 0.8 6.6 −1.0
(4.1) (1.8) (3.0) (1.2)
Temporary
workers: high (%)
9.3 −0.6 10.8 3.2
(3.6) (1.4) (4.1) (1.5)
Labour cost share:
high (%)
16.1 6.2 6.7 −0.9




13.3 3.5 5.7 −1.9
(4.5) (2.0) (2.5) (1.3)
Source: WDN surveys. Note: The table shows predicted probability from probit regressions. Standard errors are shown
within parentheses. The baseline case is a Czech firm operating in the business service sector; of small size (5–19
employees); facing weak demand and credit shocks; setting wages without a firm-level, collectively bargained contract
and without a particular time pattern at less than yearly frequency; a firm having a workforce with low shares of
temporary, white-collar, and high-skilled workers; facing weak competitive pressures; and having a low share of wages in
total costs and a low incidence of bonuses
Fabiani et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:24 Page 24 of 287 Conclusions
We exploited a unique firm-level survey to study the responses of European firms to
the sharp demand and credit reductions triggered by the global economic crisis of
2009. Most of the firms interviewed adopted at least one adjustment strategy to cope
with the crisis; even those that fared relatively better, facing only weak reductions in de-
mand, engaged in some reduction of costs, margins, or prices. Naturally, the share of
Table 14 Probability of adjusting hours worked and nonlabour costs













Manufacturing 5.7 1.0 62.6 −4.1
(3.3) (1.2) (7.3) (3.0)
Trade 3.1 −1.6 69.0 2.2
(2.1) (1.3) (7.0) (3.3)
Large firm 5.8 1.2 49.1 −17.6
(3.2) (1.6) (7.9) (4.2)
Strong demand +
weak credit shock
5.1 0.5 46.3 −20.4
(3.0) (0.8) (8.0) (2.6)
Strong demand +
strong credit shock
5.6 1.0 57.3 −9.5
(3.2) (1.0) (7.9) (3.0)
Time-dependent
wages
5.3 0.7 64.5 −2.2
(3.2) (1.0) (7.5) (2.6)
Frequent wage
adjustment
4.1 −0.6 73.4 6.6
(2.7) (1.1) (7.1) (3.0)
Strong competitive
pressures
3.8 −0.8 67.2 0.4




5.3 0.7 67.4 0.7
(3.2) (1.0) (7.3) (2.9)
White-collar
workers: high (%)
3.7 −0.9 72.6 5.8
(2.5) (1.0) (7.0) (2.9)
High-skilled
workers: high (%)
2.9 −1.7 67.2 0.4




4.3 −0.4 65.1 −1.7
(2.7) (0.8) (7.3) (2.7)
Labour cost share:
high (%)
4.2 −0.5 61.6 −5.2




3.1 −1.6 64.3 −2.4
(2.0) (1.2) (7.3) (3.0)
Source: WDN surveys. Note: The table shows the predicted probability from probit regressions. Standard errors are shown
within parentheses. The baseline case is a Czech firm operating in the business service sector; of small size (5–19
employees); facing weak demand and credit shocks; setting wages without a firm-level, collectively bargained contract
and without a particular time pattern at less than yearly frequency; a firm having a workforce with low shares of
temporary, white-collar, and high-skilled workers; facing weak competitive pressures; and having a low share of wages in
total costs and a low incidence of bonuses
Fabiani et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:24 Page 25 of 28firms responding to the crisis increases with the intensity of the shock: when a strong
demand reduction was coupled with an inability to access credit, 94% of the firms inter-
viewed engaged in cost-cutting strategies. Adjusting either margins or output was the
second-place option, chosen by approximately two-thirds of the companies.
As for the various cost reduction strategies that firms used, the one most commonly
preferred was reduction of nonlabour costs. Although the survey did not investigate
Fabiani et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:24 Page 26 of 28the nature of such costs, it seems plausible that they relate to ancillary activities and to
the margins of input providers.
Firms which adjusted labour costs did so primarily by laying off temporary employees
and reducing hours worked. Dismissal of permanent employees was instead relatively
uncommon, confirming the dual nature of European labour markets.
Our findings sanction the firms’ strong resistance to base wage cuts: the firms in
our sample countries almost never implemented such reductions except in Estonia.
There, almost 45% of the firms reduced nominal wages in response to the crisis,
plausibly because of the downturn’s exceptional magnitude relative to the other
countries and because of the ample institutional flexibility in Estonian wage-setting
practices.
Firms elsewhere reduced wages through a combination of base wage freezes and cuts
in flexible pay components: overall, slightly more than 30% of employees experienced
wage freezes in summer 2009, whereas wage freezes had affected, on average, less than
5% of employees in the five years from 2003 through 2007. Thus, despite the presence
of extremely slow growth and even negative inflation rates, downward nominal wage
rigidity remained a binding constraint for firms’ wage bill adjustments.Endnotes
1A similar survey was also conducted in Germany, but the main questions used in
this paper are not comparable (Radowski and Bonin 2009).
2The harmonised questionnaires of both surveys contained core sets of questions
which were asked in all countries. Some of the national questionnaires were further
adapted to account for specific country characteristics and differences in institutional
framework. As a result, some countries opted for shorter versions of surveys, while
others extended them in several dimensions.
3For each firm or observation, these weights indicate the number of employees a
given observation represents in the population. Those numbers are calculated as the
sum of all employees in the population within a sampling category (by country, sector,
firm size, and sometimes region, depending on the sampling strata) divided by the
number of observations in that category. They were produced by the WDN staff and
made available in the harmonised dataset.
4The correlation also hinges on Poland, which is the country that hardly experienced
any GDP contraction.
5However, firms may undertake costly activities with long run potential, like research,
product development, or training of employees. These activities are often cut when
firms are cash constrained, and this should not be interpreted as the firms not
minimising costs. We also acknowledge that economic conditions change once the
shock occurs. In particular, if the shock is shared across firms and deteriorates other
markets (e.g., the markets for intermediate goods and labour), opportunities may well
emerge to trade down wages and input prices. Unfortunately, the broad level of the sec-
tor classification in our data does not allow us to distinguish between purely idiosyn-
cratic shocks and aggregate or sectoral ones.
6Other potential combinations were chosen by less than 5% of the firms and are not
shown in Table 7.
Fabiani et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:24 Page 27 of 287Akerlof et al. (1996) reported results from phone interviews with 409 individuals in
the Washington, DC area who had not changed jobs during the previous 12 months;
among them, only seven reported salary cuts. Fehr and Goette (2005) analysed yearly
wage changes from company files for two Swiss firms in the service industry during
low-inflation years. In the larger firm, only 1.7% of the observations constituted wage
cuts, while the percentage in the medium-size firm was even lower, at 0.4%.
8This evidence contrasts with some perceptions in the media during that period that
certain large companies lowered wages to protect jobs. On April 9, 2009, the Wall
Street Journal published an article titled “Salary cuts: ugly, but it could be worse” that
repeated news of recent moves towards wage cuts by important firms, including
Hewlett-Packard, A.H. Belo Corp., and the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, among others.
“Organizations in dire straits may have no choice but to slash salaries across the board,”
the article stated. Similar pieces in the Financial Times and leading economic maga-
zines were published during the same period.
9Estonia’s less-stringent EPL is not reflected in the OECD EPL index that we use in
this study, which relies on EPL in 2008.
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